



Emergency Disaster Assistance Fund (EDAF) Monitoring Report DREF Operation – Indonesia: Drought Response 2023



Photo: PMI volunteer conducting water trucking in Lombok district July 2024

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Acronym & Abbreviations List

CCD: Country Cluster Delegation (IFRC)
CEA: Community Engagement and Accountability
CFM: Complaint and Feedback Mechanism
CRC: Canadian Red Cross
CVA: Cash & Voucher Assistance
DAG: DREF Advisory Group
DOHE: Deployment of Humanitarian Experts Project
DREF: Disaster Relief Emergency Fund
EDAF: Emergency Disaster Assistance Fund
EOC: Emergency Operations Centre
FGD: Focus Group Discussion
GAC: Global Affairs Canada
GESI: Gender Equality & Social Inclusion
HH: Household
HQ: Headquarters
IFRC: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
INGO: International Non-Governmental Organization
KII: Key Informant Interview
M&E: Monitoring and Evaluation
NGO: Non-Governmental Organization
NHQ: National Headquarters
NS: National Society/ies
NSD: National Society Development
PAR: Participatory Action Research
PDM: Post Distribution Monitoring
PGI: Protection, Gender, and Inclusion
PMER: Planning, Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting
PMI: Indonesian Red Crescent
PNS: Partner National Society/Participating National Society
PSS: Psychosocial Support
PSEA: Protection Against Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
SADDD: Sex, Age and Disability Disaggregated Data
SP: Strategic Partnership
ToRs: Terms of Reference
UN: United Nations
WASH: Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WHO: World Health Organization



Summary of Operation and CRC/GAC Contribution

SUMMARY OF OPERATION	
DREF/Appeal number	MDRID026
DREF/Appeal title	Indonesia: Drought Response 2023
Location of operation	Indonesia (Targeted areas: Nangroe Aceh Darussalam, Sumatera Utara, Sumatera Barat, Riau, Jambi, Sumatera Selatan, Bengkulu, Lampung, Bangka Belitung, Kepulauan-riau, Dki Jakarta, Jawa Barat, Jawa Tengah, Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta, Jawa Timur, Banten, Bali, Nusatenggara Barat, Nusatenggara Timur, Kalimantan Barat, Kalimantan Tengah, Kalimantan Selatan, Kalimantan Timur, Sulawesi Utara, Sulawesi Tengah, Sulawesi Selatan, Sulawesi Tenggara, Gorontalo, Sulawesi Barat, Maluku, Maluku Utara, Papua, Papua Barat)
Target number of affected people	45,000 people targeted, 18,750,000 people affected ¹ Based on the date listed in the DREF report: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Women 22,239 • Girls (under 18) 5,404 - • Men 22,761 • Boys (under 18) 5,531 • People with disabilities (estimated) 8.5%
Operation budget and coverage	580,079 CHF
Timeframe of operation	06-09-2023 – 30-06-2024 (extended from initial end date 03-31-2024)
Operational objective(s)	Aimed to meet immediate water needs of 25,000 people across 17 provinces through water trucking activities, provision of communal and household water storage. The

¹ There was no comprehensive breakdown of sex through the report, with only partial SADD data

	operation also aims to develop community awareness especially in Health, WASH, drought awareness and preparedness with integrated PGI and CEA components.
Overall results achieved	The final report for the DREF Operation had not been completed by the time of the monitoring mission. Please refer to the EDAF Monitoring Matrix for a detailed assessment of progress towards results.
CRC/GAC CONTRIBUTION (please specify source)	
Funds	CAD 50,000
Surge	N/A
Other	N/A



MONITORING MISSION OVERVIEW

From 8 to 12 July 2024, the Canadian Red Cross (CRC) conducted a monitoring mission under the Strategic Partnership (SP) project Emergency Disaster Assistance Fund (EDAF) to the Indonesian Red Crescent (PMI) to review the progress made on the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies' (IFRC) Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF)-supported Operation Indonesia Drought 2023 (MDRID026).

This monitoring mission, conducted by a female and a male CRC staff members and supported in-country by several key PMI team members (10 male and 4 women, plus PMI district-level staff and volunteers), included a review of the progress against the planned objectives and outputs according to the operational strategy and the DREF budget to establish key achievements, challenges, and lessons learned within the scope of the DREF Operation up to the date of the monitoring visit. The DREF Operation targeted communities in the following provinces of Indonesia: Nangroe Aceh Darussalam, Sumatera Utara, Sumatera Barat, Riau, Jambi, Sumatera Selatan, Bengkulu, Lampung, Bangka Belitung, Kepulauan-riau, Dki Jakarta, Jawa Barat, Jawa Tengah, Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta, Jawa Timur, Banten, Bali, Nusatenggara Barat, Nusatenggara Timur, Kalimantan Barat, Kalimantan Tengah, Kalimantan Selatan, Kalimantan Timur, Sulawesi Utara, Sulawesi Tengah, Sulawesi Selatan, Sulawesi Tenggara, Gorontalo, Sulawesi Barat, Maluku, Maluku Utara, Papua, Papua Barat affected by the drought of 2023. After February 2024, the DREF extended the operations only in the provinces that still experienced water scarcity, namely East Java, Bali, West Nusa Tenggara, and East Nusa Tenggara.

Learnings from this review will inform future joint monitoring missions under the Strategic Partnerships with Global Affairs Canada (GAC), provide recommendations on possible improvements of CRC and GAC support to IFRC operations, and share impactful practices employed in the intersectoral response of the National Society. As part of CRC's commitment to sharing lessons learned within Movement forums and advocate for broader uptake of best practices, CRC will share the key findings of this mission at the IFRC DREF Advisory Group (DAG).

Situation

Located along the equator, Indonesia naturally has two seasons that is dry season and rainy season. The dry season commonly lasts from June until November each year and the rainy season lasts from December until May. However, given its wide geographical span, the timing and intensity of rainfall also varies significantly between regions. In March 2023, the Meteorology, Climatology, and Geophysics Agency (BMKG) issued advice that the intensifying El Niño phenomenon and positive Indian Ocean Dipole (IOD) may cause a drought during the dry season in Indonesia. The concurrence of both phenomena led to decreased rainfall across the Indonesian region. Based on BMKG's forecast, the dry season (determined from days without rain) reached its peak in October 2023 for several areas such as the Southern Part of Sumatra, the Southern part of Kalimantan, and Java Island, or November 2023 for Bali, East Nusa Tenggara, and West Nusa Tenggara area due to anomalies in Pacific Ocean temperatures that have been

growing, with the index reaching 0.8, concerningly close to the threshold of 1, at which point the El Niño status goes from "Weak" to "Moderate." Adding to the forecast, BMKG indicated that the El Niño phenomenon would continue beyond February. Consequently, as El Niño triggered low rainfall probability, several regions in Indonesia continued to be impacted by prolonged drought or less rainfall beyond November 2024.

18,750,000 people were affected by the drought. The prolonged drought season elevated the risk of water scarcity as a predominant concern for people living in the affected areas. The potential and current absence of an adequate water supply places households in a vulnerable position, subjecting them to potential threats to health, hygiene, and overall livelihoods. A significant number of boreholes dried out or had limited water, making it increasingly challenging for people to meet their daily water consumption needs. As an alternative, communities turned to wells outside their boundaries, as well as nearby rivers and other unprotected sources. These water sources also saw a reduced levels due to the lack of rainfall, exacerbating the water scarcity issue. As a result, communities were compelled to travel longer distances in search of other water resources, such as dams or ponds. Individuals consuming water from these sources were exposed to waterborne diseases and contaminants, leading to a potential public health crisis.²

Response

PMI completed a rapid assessment to determine impact as well as collating secondary information provided by BMKG and the National Agency for Disaster Management (BNPB). Through this DREF operation, the assessment report served as a baseline to mobilize resources, as well as to guide internal and external coordination on joint efforts by various organizations in the country. At the national, provincial and district level, PMI chapters coordinated with their respective local governments. In the initial period of the operation, there were eight branches at the provincial level responding to the drought, with 49 water trucks mobilized across 44 affected districts, mobilized 56 personnel and distributed over 965,000 litres of water to the affected communities. There is currently an in-country presence of two Partner National Societies (American Red Cross, Japanese Red Cross), and until mid-2023 also the Turkish Red Crescent had presence. All partners, together with IFRC, closely monitored the developments. IFRC has a country cluster delegation (CCD) for Indonesia, Singapore, Brunei Darussalam and Timor-Leste in Jakarta consisting of a head of office and technical capacities in a multitude of departments.

The operational objective of Indonesia Drought DREF (**MDRID026**) was to meet the immediate water needs of 25,000 people across 17 provinces through water trucking activities, and the provision of communal and household water storage facilities. Water trucking activities were planned to last from August to October 2023 and provide clean water daily during the three-month implementation period. The operation also aimed to develop community awareness especially in health, WASH, drought awareness and preparedness with PGI and CEA components integrated in the response such as feedback mechanisms, hotlines, and door-to-door discussions.

² Please note that there was no PGI analysis in the documents reviewed by the DREF team.

DREF Operation Revision

Throughout the initial six-month implementation period, PMI managed to distribute more than 90 million liters of water, benefiting an average of 33,642 people daily. However, the typical Indonesian monsoon season started in the last quarter of the year until the first quarter of the following year, resulting in more areas experiencing rainfall. Due to these changes, PMI, with IFRC's support, deployed an assessment team to analyze the changing situation and needs at the field level to better understand the DREF Operation's fit-for-purpose. The assessment was conducted in four provinces in Indonesia, namely Bali, East Nusa Tenggara, West Nusa Tenggara, and East Java. Several parameters to support the analysis, such as rainfall forecast data, number of days without rain, climate zone, PMI water distribution capacity, and inputs from the branches, were considered to determine the assessment priority locations. Based on the findings of the assessment, and with IFRC's support, PMI launched a DREF revision request in which the initial operation was extended to 30 June 2024, with the budget of 580,079 CHF remaining the same.

Several modifications were made to the original operational plan, including:

- **WASH:** In the WASH sector, besides the operation of water trucking, PMI considered a handful of early-recovery support initiatives to the communities by rehabilitating communal water resources and water support facilities in the revised DREF Operation's targeted provinces. This is to ensure sustainability and provide a longer solution to the community.
- **Livelihoods and CVA:** launch of the multipurpose cash transfer program (CVA) to 1150 individuals (230 farmer households) in different target groups – inclusion factors integrate gender, diversity, and disability in the response, although no further information was provided to the DREF Review team on what diversity PMI was referring to. PMI used a vulnerability criterion to develop its targeting strategy. This CVA supported the affected population's income generating needs. Training materials were provided to the targeted community to ensure continuing capacity development.



Key Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations

Effectiveness				
Guiding Question: Did the operation meet, or is it on track to meet, the needs of targeted population?				
Issue	Finding	Evidence	Conclusion	Recommendations (clarify to whom the recommendation is for)
<p>The NSs leadership guidance led to a prioritization of certain DREF Operation activities over others</p>	<p>While some activities were completed in entirety, and strongly executed (ie., water trucking), other activities were deprioritized by the NSs leadership and led to an unequal level of completion in the DREF Operation</p>	<p>During KIIs, the NSs noted that HQ direction was to prioritize the WASH programming, specifically the water trucking, due to the strong level of partnership and coordination with the Indonesian government, but also perceived fundraising and visibility needs</p> <p>This focus led to other activities, such as PGI support to families, health promotion, and WASH small-scale equipment and infrastructure not being programmed consistently and the NS falling short of its targets.</p>	<p>During the DREF Operation revision, the activities that were not supported by PMI HQ should have been revised or removed from the operation to reflect the NSs true ability to achieve the DREF Operational targets.</p> <p>The prioritization of activities should be decided based on clearer criteria, such as impact and effectiveness. Furthermore, sustainability should also play a more important role. In this sense, water trucking is neither a sustainable nor an effective practice and its impact is limited given the available resources.</p>	<p>IFRC: Verify with the NS what activities can be completed during the timeframe, particularly when a DREF Operation is being revised.</p> <p>PMI: If working on activities simultaneously is not possible, once an activity has met its targets, begin working on another activity to ensure that all can be as close to the targets as possible. Work on internal systems and capacity to ensure that different sectoral activities can be met.</p> <p>PMI: Prioritizing Early Recovery and Anticipatory Action, such as wells and small-scale network rehabilitation, especially during the DREF extension, would ensure targets are met and the communities' coping mechanisms are strengthened. In addition, PMI might consider outsourcing part of the water trucking activities to outsider suppliers through framework agreements. This could result in better value for money and faster deployment of assets.</p>
Coherence				
Guiding Question: How well was response coordination within the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement partners managed?				

Issues	Finding	Evidence	Conclusion	Recommendations (clarify to whom the recommendation is for)
<p>Coordination of DREF operation activities between Movement and external partners</p>	<p>Movement coordination (between NS and IFRC RO and CCD) along with external partners was strong throughout the operation.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Strong communication was established between PMI and IFRC, helping to ensure there was a strong support in place and oversight of the operation. - Existing bilateral partnerships with PNSs and government partners enhanced PMI’s ability to implement the activities and expand the scope of the intervention through coordinating with government agencies for beneficiary selection and emergency data. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Technical support from IFRC was evident and required. There is a need to ensure however that while providing this type of support the responsibility of setting operational priorities remains with the NS - PMI has built a strong collaborative relationship with the Indonesian government through participation at national, regional, and municipal level. - Up to the DREF extension in February 2024, coordination, monitoring, and technical support appears to be solid and well-managed. Nevertheless, after the DREF extension there seems to be a lack of clarity over the activities implementation rate and impact. 	<p>PMI: continue and further enhance its successful strategies in maintaining close collaborative relationships with the Indonesian government and other relevant stakeholders. Identify when Surge support is needed from IFRC and request it when necessary.</p> <p>IFRC: While the lack of clarity is understandable given the decision of PMI to continue DREF with its own funds, it is recommended that IFRC continues with the same level of technical support.</p>
<p>Cost Effectiveness and Value for Money</p>				

Guiding Question: To what extent did the operation effectively utilize allocated funds?				
Issues	Finding	Evidence	Conclusion	Recommendations (clarify to whom the recommendation is for)
<p>Capacity gaps and high level of turnover within PMI HQ staff roles</p>	<p>While a high degree of technical expertise, including in areas such as logistics and disaster management exist at the PMI HQ level, there are capacity gaps in the WASH operational personnel and other supporting areas such as CEA or PMER which are affecting the project's ability to meet the needs of affected population.</p>	<p>During the response, technical experts from PMI's HQ were deployed to relevant provinces to support operations. During that time, there was a high degree of turnover and organizational changes with individuals in different departments. For example, the lead focal point for PMI's HQ's Disaster Management team changed at the beginning of DREF and there were some key information behind decisions which were lost. Additionally, PMI noted that due to a lack of staff in PMER this has led to activity completion not being properly documented, including SADD data.</p> <p>The staff turnover also affected WASH, with the changing of the WASH manager during the operation.</p> <p>The WASH Department is well-versed in Emergency response, but the WASH training is limited to the basic WASH training which limits the effectiveness and scope of Early Recovery efforts and sustainability.</p>	<p>There was a gap in departments such as CEA, PMER, and WASH capacity in the NS at the HQ level during the operation due to staff turnover, which impacted the DREF Operation's success</p>	<p>For CRC: Continue to advocate with IFRC on the importance of investing in capacity building initiatives to enable NSs to respond to disasters effectively and make the most efficient use of Movement emergency response tools (such as DREF).</p> <p>For PMI: Have an appropriate number of staff for the DREF Operation to ensure there are no capacity gaps, and therefore a lack of knowledge or skillset, during programming. Request Surge support when necessary if the position cannot be filled internally and the project can meet its target.</p> <p>In addition, an option for PMI and its partners is to adapt and roll out several advanced technical training courses, ensuring that community infrastructures and facilities are upgraded to deliver a wider, long-term impact while adhering to quality standards. Outside the RCRC Movement, PMI could continue advancing the WASH Center of Excellence initiative, which partners with several universities in the country to offer WASH technical training and internships. This initiative is a step in the right direction and could be further strengthened. Furthermore, the recent decision to detach WASH from Health and create a separate Department will probably ensure better resource allocation for training and capacity-building.</p>

<p>Lack of mapping of local skills and capacities</p>	<p>PMI has emphasized the need for enhanced capacity building and a comprehensive mapping of training needs in its 2030 WASH Roadmap. In line with this, the monitoring mission identified insufficient advanced trainings and the absence of consolidated and updated databases on volunteer and staff capacities.</p>	<p>Upon joining, PMI volunteers undergo induction training and can specialize through various advanced training programs. However, the number of trained volunteers and the level of their training remain areas for improvement. According to FGD in Lombok branch, several volunteers did not complete the mandatory induction trainings, and despite the importance of WASH in disaster response, only 3 out of 20 volunteers received basic WASH training, which was limited to water distribution. Furthermore, both PMI staff and volunteers have emphasized the need to revise and update the current training modules, which dates back to 2007, to ensure they remain relevant and effective. Adding to these challenges, there appears to be a lack of communication between the branches and the HQ regarding current capacities and training needs.</p>	<p>Insufficient HR resource mapping has possibly led to gaps in quality and monitoring as well as an uneven distribution of HQ or district support across different areas of this operation.</p>	<p>For PMI: According to the WASH Roadmap 2030, training needs and capacity mapping should be finalized in 2024, which would be highly beneficial at district and branch level.</p> <p>Following that, it would be important to revise the training modules and conduct consultations with volunteers, integrating their needs and feedback on the training guidelines and modules.</p>
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<p>Further strengthening of internal efforts on Anticipatory Action for drought responses is necessary to ensure that the NS is prepared</p>	<p>- There remains gaps in the EAP for droughts (e.g., indicator for trigger) in spite of previous strong DREF Operations in the past, including drought responses and the presence of a strong set of tools, best practices, and coordination with external bodies.</p>	<p>- As droughts are recurrent in Indonesia, PMI was unable to find a key evidence-based indicator to set a trigger that is required by a drought imminent DREF Operation. During KIIs, NS staff noted that an Imminent DREF was not possible as the NS had not created a clear SOP on drought responses, like it had been done for flooding. During an FGD, IFRC CCD noted that there were discussions between IFRC and the NS on an EAP, but ultimately EAP was not selected as an option. IFRC and the NS still need to discuss what the triggers are for a drought EAP. Droughts are recurrent in different parts of the country, during the monitoring mission there were already multiple provinces that had declared a state of drought, with the NS preparing to respond.</p> <p>- The lack of drought-specific EAP and AA protocols and tools resulted in inconsistencies in the delivery of WASH assistance. While good practices were observed at the branch level, apparently these were neither documented nor systematically shared and integrated across the operation. For instance, jerrycans were distributed during the initial phase of the operation but were not provided in the second phase, at least in</p>	<p>While a DREF Operation can cover certain components of an emergency response, if the NS had access to available agreed-upon funding through an imminent DREF or an EAP. There is a need to support the NS to develop EAP and AA protocols and tools for drought response, likely through the Anticipation Hub in collaboration with relevant national authorities.</p>	<p>IFRC: to continue encourage NSs to capitalize on tools and resources built as part of previous DREF operations and/or core programming when delivering emergency operations, as this increases value for money. Work with PMI to develop a drought SOP and all other necessary EAP documentation and tools so that PMI can access funding in the future as this is a frequently occurring emergency.</p> <p>PMI: Continue the good practice of utilizing existing expertise and repackaging tools and resources proven to be successful under other projects as part of future emergency operations for droughts. PMI could make use of support to strengthen its internal mechanisms on drought triggers, and other readiness components to ensure that it can respond swiftly.</p> <p>Continue to prioritize small-scale WASH community infrastructures and develop protocols while establishing protocols for community WASH rehabilitation, water quality management, and safe water storage. Some of these issues were brought up during the Lessons Learned workshop. It is highly recommended to ensure that the branches not only disseminate the results but also integrate the recommendations into</p>
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		<p>the areas visited. This occurred seemingly without any shared criteria guiding this decision. Similarly, chlorine tablets were reportedly not distributed throughout the operation, despite a higher prevalence of waterborne diseases in the areas visited, compared to the national average. Although the monitoring mission was unable to conduct water testing, several potential risk factors were observed, including the chlorination schedule of PMI water trucks and the water distribution modality. Community WASH rehabilitation could also be better aligned with needs identification, quality assurance, and sustainability.</p>		<p>future operations. The NS could make use of enhanced and strengthened reporting mechanisms across branches to improve the dissemination of standards and approaches, troubleshooting, and quality-assurance.</p>
Integration of cross-cutting themes				
Guiding Question: Were Community Engagement and Accountability/CEA as well as Protection, Gender, and Inclusiveness/PGI and Environmental sustainability cross-cutting themes integrated in a meaningful way into all phases of the operation completed to date?				
Issues	Finding	Evidence	Conclusion	Recommendations (clarify to whom the recommendation is for)
Application of Protection, Gender, and Inclusion lens in the DREF Operation,	<p>- Several relevant observations allowed the monitoring team to conclude that PGI was not well integrated into the response. There seemed to be a lack of NS PGI capacity and systems in place but there was an investment in PGI under</p>	<p>- Limited PSEA workshops or trainings were facilitated for the NSs staff and volunteers. If the training was recommended to staff and volunteers then it wasn't enforced as many volunteers reported not completing the training for this DREF Operation. - There was limited to no SADD collected. While the NS did target the specific needs of different vulnerable community groups in the area, that wasn't accurately reported</p>	<p>-PGI lens were insufficiently integrated into the response and more focused effort needs to be invested in PGI integration</p>	<p>For CRC: Continue advocacy within the DREF Advisory Group (DAG) and other Movement forums on PGI, as the impact of these efforts can positively impact operations. For example, CRC, along with other partners, advocated at DAG for adding PGI as a mandatory component of all DREF Operations has helped NS PGI focal points to ensure that PGI is integrated in the DREF operations they are supporting within their</p>

	<p>the DREF Operation as there was a sufficient budget and activities designed.</p>	<p>on and shown to be woven into the activities. For example, PMI volunteers spoke of providing water trucking distributions to specific households who had persons with disabilities in it but did not report on it.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - There was a lack of analysis of the impact the drought had on women, girls, and people with disability. This analysis could have better shaped the DREF application and implementation period to respond more accurately to differentiated needs. - There is a significant gap in PGIE policies, including Safeguarding, Child Protection, and SGBV which impacts the NS's staff's understanding of the topic. - The NS did design and implement effective community feedback mechanisms with different communication options to serve people with different needs. Positive mechanisms included door-to-door feedback collection with volunteers, a hotline recipients could call into, and WhatsApp messaging. The variety of channels allowed for different people to raise their feedback and concerns. 		<p>NS.IFRC: Where possible, identify opportunities and resources to support the NS with capacity building in PGI, especially given the existence of a focal point as part of the PMI's core staff structure.</p> <p>PMI: Strengthen and expand integration of PGI into future DREF Operations and throughout PMI overall. When making future DREF applications, ensure sufficient PGI staffing and budget is available to building capacity and allow PGI to be fully integrated into the operation and relevant activities to be undertaken (training for staff and volunteers, community level activities, printed materials distribution, etc.). Alternatively, if funding allows it, consider requesting PGI Surge support for future responses to augment existing resources (e.g., to support the PGI focal point) and enable the NS to build PGI capacities at branch and volunteer level and implement more PGI activities within communities. It is also recommended that in-person or virtual training on PGI including minimum standards, tools, and referral pathways be given to staff and volunteers.</p>
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Interview Schedule and Locations

The interview schedule can be found in Annex 4.



EDAF Monitoring Matrix

Criteria	Scoring	Justification
1. CRITERIA: EFFECTIVENESS and VALUE FOR MONEY		
Guiding Question: Did the operation meet, or is it on track to meet, the needs of targeted population?		
Sub-Criteria: Effective operational design and management	Overall Score: 3/5	
Question 1: What is the overall status of the operation vis a vis its targets?	Score 3/5 5: Operation likely to exceed all targets. 4: Operation likely to meet all targets. 3: Operation likely to meet some targets. 2: Operation not likely to meet most targets. 1: Operation not likely to meet any targets	Justification While the DREF Operation's Final Report had not been released at the time of writing of this report, the operation was partially on-track to meet some targets at the time of the monitoring mission. The operational design was based on data and evidence including multi-sectoral assessments. PMI's assessment and project design were based on lessons learnt and best practices from previous DREF Operations. Overall, PMI did choose to prioritize some sectors over others leading to significant overachievement in some activities compared to incomplete, or not initiated, activities in other sectors.
QUESTION	KEY POINTS/OBSERVATIONS, INCLUDING DATA SOURCES	
MANDATORY 1: Based on the most recent DREF target, does the number of disaster affected people reached meet the most recent target at the time of monitoring?	At the time of the monitoring mission, the targets related to people reached overall, 45,000 individuals (note the lack of SADD data in this operation), was achieved through water trucking distribution. As this was the primary focus for PMI during the operation, the NS was able to significantly overachieve its target of 25,000 individuals, through reaching 5,349,821 individuals cumulatively throughout the DREF Operation. This figure has not been verified against double counting, as the current documentation shows only how many individuals attend each water distribution session, not if they are a new beneficiary or recurring, i.e. the number of individuals is counted for each distribution and not cross-referenced if they've received assistance before. For the Livelihood cash and voucher assistance (CVA) provided to farmer households, PMI exceed its targets of 1,150 individuals reached with Livelihood training and support, with 1,700 individuals reached total.	

	<p>When reviewing other components of the DREF Operation, the targets had not yet been fully achieved, and according to PMI staff were unlikely to be achieved once reporting was finalized. For example, for Health it was expected that 20,000 individuals would be reached through health promotion but only 3,977 individuals had been reached, monitored, and reported on internally at PMI by the time of the DREF. For other activities, such as 3,000 families caring for vulnerable groups reached by protection, gender and inclusion services, this activity was not done. PMI staff members noted that once the DREF was approved, there was clear direction from PMI leadership to focus on water distribution activities based on the guidance and support from the Indonesian government. This direction helps to explain why certain activities were overperforming compared to others.</p> <p><i>(Sources: Document review; KIIs with PMI Disaster Management team).</i></p>
<p>If the operation has ended, what were the estimated actual achievement versus the most recent targets? What were the gaps, if any?</p>	<p>Please refer to the previous question for this information.</p>
<p>MANDATORY 2: Were there big changes to the needs/context to this date? Did the plan adapt to them accordingly? (e.g., an adjustment in the numbers of people targeted in the course of the operation)</p>	<p>On 6 September 2023, PMI launched this DREF Operation with the aim of addressing the humanitarian consequences arising from a drought in the affected areas of Lampung, Jawa Barat, Jawa Tengah, Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta, Jawa Timur, Banten, Bali, Nusatenggara Barat, Nusatenggara Timur, Kalimantan Barat, Kalimantan Selatan, Sulawesi Selatan, Sulawesi Tenggara, Sulawesi Barat, Maluku, Papua, and Papua Barat. Responding to the situation, the DREF operation kicked off as district and provincial-level RC bodies and local authorities began drought response phases in their respective areas. By December 2023, government officials indicated that 12.5% of areas continued to experience below-normal rainfall due to El Nino, specifically East Java, Bali, West Nusa Tenggara, and East Nusa Tenggara, while rainfall in the other areas were expected to resume to normal levels.</p> <p>Following an assessment, PMI adjusted the operational plan in February 2024 to include the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • WASH: Based on identified gaps and needs still relevant in the four provinces listed above, PMI continued support for three additional months specifically on water trucking operations and WASH and health promotion. PMI also focused on rehabilitating communal water sources and water support facilities in the four targeted provinces. Finally, PMI focused on providing WASH promotional sessions in the community, including promotional materials, to maintain the water distribution facilities.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Livelihoods: Based on the assessment report conducted in January 2024, livelihood needs were identified as a priority, specifically cash and voucher assistance for livelihood support and trainings to affected community members. <p>The number of individuals targeted by the operation did not increase with the DREF Operation Update. The budget adjustment was only due to a reallocation of funds between budget lines to account for the inclusion of CVA activities and prolonging WASH activities in the four provinces. Specifically, with CVA this budget reallocation allowed for 1,150 individuals to be assisted by livelihood support and capacity development to targeted micro-farmers in Malang and Pamekasan districts. The following vulnerability criteria were applied for the micro-farmers selection (at least one of the following): pregnant or lactating women; female-headed household; elderly living alone; households with persons with disabilities.</p> <p><i>(Sources: Document review, KIIs with PMI DREF Implementation Team)</i></p>	
<p>Question 2: Was the communication strategy utilized by the NS to convey information to targeted people adequate?</p>	<p>Score 4/5</p> <p>5: Communication strategy was exceptionally strong.</p> <p>4: Communication strategy was strong.</p> <p>3: Communication strategy was adequate.</p> <p>2: Communication strategy was partially adequate.</p> <p>1: Communication strategy was completely inadequate</p>	<p>Justification:</p> <p>PMI’s communication strategy for this DREF Operation was strong and capitalized on lessons learned from previous emergency responses and ongoing community-level programming. The communication strategy integrated CEA best practices and used diverse communication methods to meet the different communication needs and preferences of different community members to ensure that information reached those most at risk of being excluded. PMI could utilize more verbal communication methods, such as roving speakers to promote PMI’s work. Additionally, PMI could ensure that all communication materials are translated in the local language and reported on in DREF Operational Updates.</p>
QUESTION	KEY POINTS/OBSERVATIONS, INCLUDING DATA SOURCES	
<p>MANDATORY 3: What methods were used to communicate with targeted people (e.g., radio, household visit, pamphlets)?</p>	<p>PMI utilized several communication methods to communicate with affected communities, this included house-to-house visits, WhatsApp messaging, printed materials (promotional pamphlets and posters) given to the targeted people. In addition to outward facing communication, PMI also provided communications options for the affected community to communicate with the NS and provide feedback. A hotline phone number was provided in all printed materials and on stickers distributed throughout the affected communities to channel feedback and complaints about the operation. Participants in the intervention were also provided with a WhatsApp number that they could use to reach PMI to ask questions or resolve issues related to the water trucking, water resources rehabilitation programs, or livelihood-based cash assistance.</p>	

	<p>PMI conducted awareness raising sessions with community members to develop knowledge on drought mitigation activities and hygiene promotion. PMI volunteers also spoke with key community leaders at the beginning of implementing activities to ensure community buy-in and support for the operations. These discussions with community leaders also allowed PMI to identify what areas specifically needed support with water trucking or water rehabilitation services. Feedback from these discussions were carefully documented in the assessment report and taken into consideration during programming. Some of the modifications made to the operation were based on community feedback include 1) constructing communal water storage made out of tarpaulins in East Java as per community request 2) considering the rehabilitation of water resources as part of an early-recovery solution for the community. Finally, PMI volunteers also proactively communicated with water trucking recipients regarding their satisfaction with the service provided.</p> <p><i>(Sources: Document review, KIIs with PMI Disaster Management team, KII with PMI CEA Coordinator, FGDs with PMI Volunteers, Direct Observation)</i></p>	
<p>MANDATORY 4: Why was this methodology chosen and how well did it work?</p>	<p>This methodology chosen by PMI for communicating with the affected communities was based on lessons learned from previous DREF operations, Movement trainings, and other community-level interventions carried out by the NS. The NS employed multiple techniques/methods of communication to meet the different needs of the affected people. For example, PMI chose to use WhatsApp grounds as a preferred way to gather inputs and suggestions as it is quick, easy-to-use, and a primary form of digital communications for targeted people. PMI volunteers also noted that it was difficult to record these inputs or questions as it was happening on an informal and quick basis. The PMI team also noted that by working with key community leaders allowed the PMI staff to develop community trust and ensure that the locations selected were supported by the community. The use of various communication modalities was successful, as evidenced by comments from community members during FGDs. Community members described that they appreciated the availability of PMI volunteers in their community to answer questions on programming and provide additional information regarding PMI's work.</p> <p><i>(Sources: KIIs with PMI Operations team, FGD with IFRC's DREF Implementation team, FGD with PMI's Lombok District volunteers, FGDs with PMI Lombok community members).</i></p>	
<p>Sub-Criteria: Timeliness of response</p>	<p>Overall Score: 3/5</p>	
<p>Question 1: Was the response timely or delayed?</p>	<p>Score 3/5</p> <p>5: All activities were completed ahead of schedule.</p> <p>4: All activities were completed on time.</p> <p>3: Most activities were completed on time.</p>	<p>Justification</p> <p>The NS made great use of its expertise and standing capacity, including pre-positioned water trucks and its established reputation as an expert in WASH relief, along with its well-established network of volunteers to deliver high-quality</p>

	<p>2: Few activities were completed on time. 1: No activities were completed on time</p>	<p>services to people affected by the drought. The former procurement guidelines also caused delays especially due to low procurement thresholds for direct purchases and excessive approval requirements. It is worth noting that the guidelines have now been revised and the threshold has been increased to 1,000 CHF.</p> <p>Some of the activities were on-track to be completed within the operational timeframe, other activities were deprioritized due to leadership direction and lack of sufficient trained personnel at the branch-level to complete all the necessary activities. This limitation was recognized by PMI's Disaster Management team.</p>
QUESTION	KEY POINTS/OBSERVATIONS AND DATA SOURCES	
<p>MANDATORY 5: Did the operational funds arrive in a timely manner to the Host National Society? Why or why not?</p>	<p>Funds were delayed in arriving in a timely manner to be used by PMI. The NS had to use self-funding at the beginning of the operation as it was expected for the funds to not be received within the 9-month period of the DREF. Positively though, the IFRC CCD noted that due to the close coordination and long-standing, trusting relationship between PMI and IFRC, the NS is always willing to advance its own funds to enable immediate response in the first days of the operation while the DREF application and transfer of the first tranche is being finalized. This was done so during this response as PMI has a large amount of self-funding to begin activities in August and September 2023. As the financial system in Indonesia is complicated, the NS expected for funds transfers to be delayed and was willing to self-fund the initial period of the DREF.</p> <p><i>(Sources: KII with PMI Finance Team, PMI Disaster Management Team, and FGD with IFRC's CCD team).</i></p>	
<p>MANDATORY 6 – VALUE FOR MONEY: Were there any Early Actions (e.g., prepositioning of relief items; framework agreement in place with financial institution for cash transfers, mobilization of personnel for needs assessment, pre-trained volunteers, etc. Note: all these early actions show VALUE FOR MONEY) taken by the HNS for this particular response?</p>	<p>Prepositioning of Relief Items: PMI did have prepositioned jerrycans which were mobilized and distributed to 2,000 families; 1,000 in East Java, 300 in Central Java, 500 in West Sumatra, and 200 in another province. The jerrycans had not been replenished at the time of the monitoring mission and the communities visited during this mission did not receive jerrycans at any point in time during the DREF. PMI did possess prepositioned water trucks, which were essential to provide water trucking and immediate relief to affected populations. While majority of these trucks required repairs and maintenance (which was not included in the DREF), PMI was able to cover the costs and ship 123 water trucks, 57 pickup trucks, and six operational vehicles across 130 districts in the 21 provinces. In addition to the provision of water, PMI HQ has mobilized its water treatment plant equipment along with its trained and experienced operational volunteers to Bekasi</p>	

	<p>district. Finally, in the Puncak district, PMI distributed food parcels to affected communities with the support of the Children and Women Protection and Empowerment governmental authority.</p> <p>Framework Agreements with Financial Institutions: There was a pre-established agreement in place with the Post Office as a financial institution, but the MOU was out of date when the livelihood CVA programming started under the DREF Operation. This unforeseen administrative work caused a one-month delay and resulted in PMI having to use its own MoU with Post Offices for the livelihood CVA work.</p> <p>Pre-trained Volunteers: The operation benefitted from the PMI’s standing capacity in WASH. PMI is a well recognized established auxiliary partner of the government with a national network, access at the community level, and technical expertise to deliver WASH services during emergency responses, in line with PMI’s core programming. Under the DREF, PMI mobilized its network of pre-trained volunteers to deliver WASH, health, livelihood, and CEA-related activities and made use of many existing resources like communications materials on drought management and health risks.</p> <p><i>(Sources: Document review, KIIs with PMI Disaster Management team, KIIs with PMI Logistic Officer, FGDs with Lombok District PMI Staff, FGDs with Lombok District Volunteers)</i></p>
<p>MANDATORY 7: Were there any delays in the delivery of planned services to targeted population? Why?</p>	<p>While, as indicated above, the monitoring team projects that all services planned to be delivered to the individuals targeted by this operation, there were some delays in service delivery during the operational period which has not yet been completed. The document review and interviews with key informants indicated that service delivery delays mainly related to the following factors:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prioritization of water trucking: Key PMI informants at the branch and HQ levels and among both paid staff, management, and volunteers noted that a key priority for the organization was to provide water trucking to all individuals receiving assistance. Based on Indonesian government advisement, along with the PMI board, PMI HQ and districts prioritized the distribution of water trucks throughout the affected regions. Under the DREF, this led to other activities, such as Protection-focused services to individuals or families or MHPSS services to individuals or families. • MoU with Postal Service for Cash Assistance: There was a one-month delay with transferring the cash assistance to the postal service as the MoU had expired. This resulted in PMI fronting the amount to the postal service, with the Federation reimbursing PMI later on when the MoU was resolved. <p><i>(Sources: KII with PMI DREF implementation team and management team, PMI Lombok staff and volunteers at branch level)</i></p>

2. CRITERIA: COHERENCE		
Guiding Question: How well was response coordination within the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement partners managed?		
Question 1: How well was response coordination within the Movement partners managed?	Score 4.5/5 5: Coordination was exceptionally managed. 4: Coordination was managed adequately. 3: Coordination was managed with some issues. 2: Coordination was not well managed. 1: Coordination was largely non-existent	Justification: Coordination with Movement and external partners was strong during the implementation of the DREF Operation. PMI was a highly regarded partner to the government, particularly given its ability to reach and provide support to remote communities.
DATA COLLECTION CHECKLIST		
How did the HNS work with responding partners to ensure a coordinated response?	PMI coordinated strongly with governmental agencies to alleviate drought issues throughout the country. Coordination occurred at multiple levels of the government and within PMI's system, including with agencies such as the National Agency for Disaster Management (BNPB) and the Meteorological, Climatological, and Geophysical Agency (BMKG), along with government bodies at the provincial and district level. During FGDs with government bodies, it was noted that PMI is considered a key partner for drought responses, specifically water trucking, BNPB worked to coordinate between PMI, other government bodies, and NGOs in the region to respond with emergencies activities as well as readiness activities. <i>(Source: KII with PMI DREF implementation team; FGD with BNPB and PMI Lombok staff)</i>	
MANDATORY 8: Were there any challenges related to overall regional and/or international support and IFRC response mechanisms (i.e., Surge, sit reps, bilateral assistance)?	Within the Movement, PMI coordinated effectively with partners for regional/international support when necessary. PMI expressed that it received strong support from the IFRC Delegation in Jakarta in developing the DREF application, requesting Rapid Response personnel, and in resolving day-to-day issues during the implementation phase. The surge mechanism, PMI with the support of IFRC, was able to mobilize a team of assessors consisting of an assessment coordinator, IM - humanitarian data analysis, secondary and primary data officers, and a technical officer to conduct assessments in Bali, East Nusa Tenggara, West Nusa Tenggara, and East Java provinces. The assessment was conducted from December 2023 to January 2024, while the final assessment report was reviewed and approved by PMI in February 2024. There were delays in IFRC selecting the Surge support for the assessment, resulting in the assessment being pushed from August 2023 to December 2023. KIIs with members of PMI also mentioned the appreciated support of the Australian Red Cross for providing additional drought response activities in provinces outside of the DREF operation. <i>(Sources: KII with PMI DREF implementation team, IFRC DM Delegation, Document Review).</i>	
3. CRITERIA: COST-EFFECTIVENESS and VALUE FOR MONEY		
Guiding Question: To what extent did the operation effectively utilize allocated funds?		

Sub-Criteria: Budget adequacy		Overall Score: 3/5	
Question 1: Was the budget adequate (or will it likely be adequate) to achieve the operation's goals?	Score 3/5	Justification:	
	<p>5: All activities were completed for less than budgeted.</p> <p>4: All activities were completed for the amount budgeted.</p> <p>3: Most activities were completed within the amount budgeted.</p> <p>2: The budget was inadequate to complete many activities.</p> <p>1: The budget was inadequate to complete most activities</p>	<p>As outlined above, there was a DREF reallocation for the operation which was approved in December 2023 (per the DREF Operation Update). At the time of the monitoring mission, July 2024, although the DREF had closed the financial report had not yet been completed. The PMI DREF team anticipated 108,710 CHF will need to be returned to the Federation. As there was a prioritization of water trucking at the beginning of the DREF, and then a delay in the assessment for the DREF extension, there was limited time to complete the other activities outlined in the original DREF plan.</p>	
QUESTION		KEY POINTS/OBSERVATIONS AND DATA SOURCES	
MANDATORY 9: Was there a sector or activity that required reallocation of funds? If so, why?	<p>As per the DREF Operation Update, the following reallocations were made in sector activities, operational, and supporting costs:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Livelihoods and Multi-purpose Cash // Initial: CHF 0 / Final: CHF 32,845 (allocation increased for CVA intervention based on livelihood assessment) - WASH // Initial: CHF 385,155 / Final: CHF 352,310 (the difference was re-allocated to multi-purpose cash assistance) <p>The transfer of funds from WASH activities to Livelihood activities was based on an assessment conducted in December of 2023 that identified livelihood support was necessary for some farmers in the affected districts. Due to some WASH activities not being completed by the DREF revision period, funds were transferred from that component of activities.</p> <p><i>(Source: Document Review)</i></p>		
Sub-Criteria: Sufficiency of NS resources with operational needs/VALUE FOR MONEY		Overall Score: 2.75/5	
Question 1: Were NS resources (HR, finance, logistics) sufficient to cover operational needs and requirements?	Score 2.75/5	Justification	
	<p>5: Resources exceeded operational requirements.</p> <p>4: Operational requirements were all met by NS resources.</p> <p>3: Most operational requirements were met by NS resources.</p>	<p>While PMI requested support from the IFRC to cover operational requirements, including funds (via the DREF application) and personnel/technical expertise (via a Rapid Response alert), the NS also made use of its existing resources like water trucking vehicles, pre-positioned stock, and technical expertise to ensure value for money. It is important to mention that PMI's resources capabilities</p>	

	<p>2: Some operational requirements were met by NS resources.</p> <p>1: Very few operational requirements were met by NS resources.</p>	<p>seemed to differ greatly between departments, with Finance and Logistics displaying strong abilities but the PMER team noted a lower capacity due to understaffing and decentralization of reporting to the provinces.</p>
<p>MANDATORY 10: Were procedures for transferring funds to NS branches/field colleagues in place, and was funds transfer done in a timely manner?</p>	<p>Following the coordination and assessment result, national drought operation launched on 15 August 2023, while DREF funds request was received by 24 August 2023, but the funding wasn't received until September according to IFRC. PMI has established a system to transfer funders to the branches. The transfer occurs on a monthly basis based on requests issued by the branches. For a request to be approved, the branches must submit their expense responses from the previous month and have used 80% of the funds from the previous transfer. While the transfer is often timely, typically two-weeks, there can be delays of up to one month.</p> <p><i>(Sources: KII with PMI Finance Manager and PMI DM Team)</i></p>	
<p>MANDATORY 11: Did the NS use an Emergency Response Management tool (Emergency Operations Centre, Incident Command System, or others)?</p>	<p>PMI used an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and an Incident Command System at the National headquarters and within the provincial system, respectively, which were activated during the drought. The information gathered at the EOC collates information from multiple government agencies, such as the BMKG or the BNPB. PMI staff noted that EOC staffing is ineligible under the DREF, which is difficult when PMI districts are attempting to run the EOC for 24-hour periods. The information monitored and collated in the EOC is shared with relevant partners.</p> <p><i>(Sources: Document review; KII with PMI Disaster Management team).</i></p>	
<p>PLEASE SELECT THE FOLLOWING SUPPORT FUNCTIONS (HR, LOGISTICS, ICT, PMER) TO SHOW EVIDENCE OF GOOD CAPACITY OR BIG GAP IN CAPACITY THAT WARRANT SPECIAL ATTENTION</p>		
<p>Was the operation adequately staffed?</p>	<p>The operation was staffed by existing (core) NS personnel and volunteers throughout the headquarters and in the operational districts. Throughout August to December 2023 there were 360 (no SADD data was available) Red Cross personnel deployed to respond to the emergency. There were only three HQ positions covered by the DREF operation though, with their responsibilities to monitor the operation daily and support PMI HQ with coordinating between the provinces. Overall, appropriate decisions were made related to staffing, building on lessons learned from previous operations at the district level and in some national level departments. The monitoring team did note that there seemed a lack of personnel available for PMER duties due to competing priorities with multiple operations ongoing throughout the country and based on reports submitted by the Operational Update and at the time of the monitoring mission. In regard to volunteers, there were 50 (no SADD data) volunteers who provided support during the DREF Operation implementation.</p> <p><i>(Sources: Document review; KII with PMI Disaster Management team; direct observation).</i></p>	

<p>MANDATORY 12: Were the HNS HR procedures in place adequate to facilitate expedited mobilization of resources for this operation? (Note: deployment of trained NS staff and volunteers compared with IFRC international delegates shows VALUE FOR MONEY)</p>	<p>The KIIs did not identify NS deployment/HR procedures were a significant barrier to mobilization of resources. PMI staff and volunteers expressed that it was easy to deploy and there was sufficient number of staff to support the operation at the district level and in some national level departments.</p> <p><i>(Sources: Document review, KIIs with PMI Disaster Management team).</i></p>
<p>MANDATORY 13: Did the HNS's logistics systems and fleet of vehicles enable the timely delivery of supplies and equipment to targeted people? (Note: ability of HNS to mobilize supplies, equipment, and vehicles from various sources such as Movement partners, National Society's own resources, local partners, etc, shows VALUE FOR MONEY)</p>	<p>PMI has a strong national and provincial-level logistics system that allowed for the rapid deployment of water trucks and supplies to support the operation. For the DREF Operation, three warehouses were identified and used to mobilize the water trucks and distribute water, with overall 30 trucks used to support the PMI provinces. To note, as Indonesia is a large country spanning multiple islands, it was logistically challenging to send the water trucks from the regional warehouse to the provinces, taking approximately one week before the trucks were received in each affected province. PMI staff positively noted that the shipping costs were high, but it was covered under the DREF which was helpful. One area of difficulty was that the DREF did not allow for water truck maintenance, this impacted PMI's ability to repair the trucks and keep costs minimal. In addition, the fuel expenses could not be fully reimbursed because the DREF allegedly required a competitive pricing analysis, which is not possible in Indonesia where fuel prices are regulated by the state company Pertamina. IFRC's procurement guideline also caused delays due to lengthy internal approvals and the low procurement threshold, by the time of writing this report these guidelines have changed and the threshold has increased. Finally, PMI noted that as PMI HQ is focusing on localization and decentralization for each provincial branch, there has been an emphasis on strengthening the logistics readiness of each province to avoid mass freight movements as seen with the water trucks in this DREF Operation.</p> <p><i>(Sources: Document review, KIIs with Disaster Management team and Logistics team, KIIs with Lombok PMI provincial staff).</i></p>
<p>MANDATORY 14: In what ways were learnings and recommendations from previous operations used in the planning/design and implementation of this operation? (Note: applied lessons can show VALUE FOR MONEY)</p>	<p>As droughts are reoccurring in Indonesia, PMI has experience managing these types of responses and therefore has incorporated lessons learnt from each prior operation. PMI has a strong relationship with the Indonesian government, when the drought was declared in each province the government selected PMI to lead the water trucking response given its reliability and strong programming in previous years. PMI also has a strong level of experience in CVA programming, when the assessment findings saw that there was a gap of livelihood income for select farmers in the provinces PMI was able to begin implementing CVA for livelihoods quickly and effectively. One gap in learnings was PGI, specifically gender balance in staff and volunteers, PMI noted that there is a lack of understanding from the staff and how a PGI lens and activities can be incorporated into the DREF and holistically in the organization. Finally, a lessons learnt workshop was held at the end of June 2024 with the Disaster Management team attending, along with the provinces and Federation. During the workshop, water distribution standards were reviewed and identified as needing</p>

	<p>improvement in future responses. In addition, the need to develop adequate EAP for droughts was highlighted, given their now yearly occurrence.</p> <p><i>(Sources: Document review, KIIs with Disaster Management team and PMER team, KIIs with Lombok PMI provincial staff, FGD with IFRC Delegation).</i></p>	
Sub-criteria: Value for money	Overall Score: 3.5/5	
Question 1: Were there factors which decreased the operation's value for money?	<p>Score 3.5/5</p> <p>5: Operation demonstrated excellent value for money.</p> <p>4: Operation demonstrated good value for money.</p> <p>3: Operation demonstrated adequate value for money.</p> <p>2: Operation demonstrated poor value for money.</p> <p>1: Operation demonstrated extremely poor value for money.</p>	<p>Justification</p> <p>Some key decisions allowed for good value for money including mobilization of some pre-positioned items, use of existing NS capacities (including vehicles, technical expertise), and effective engagement of Rapid Response to build NS capacity in addition to supporting effective, high-quality emergency response service delivery. Some inefficiencies were identified related to the movement of water trucks throughout the provinces and inefficiencies with IFRC Surge being able to deploy in a timely manner. PMI also planned to submit a fuel subsidy request to the government which could enhance cost-efficiency. However, the request has not materialized during this operation, seemingly due to procedural issue and unclear standards.</p>
QUESTION	KEY POINTS/OBSERVATIONS AND DATA SOURCES	
What are the reasons for NS to distribute relief items only, cash only, or mixed of relief items and cash only?	<p>PMI provided a mix of relief items and cash assistance, amongst other support provided. The decision to use these modalities was based on needs assessments in the affected communities during the onset of the drought and then following during the extension assessments conducted in December 2023. PMI also chose to prioritize relief items and cash due to PMI's provincial and district priorities, such as logistics and warehousing capacities (there was a previous initiative by a PNS to strengthen the warehouse capacity in Indonesia) and the availability of some pre-positioned supplies, specifically jerrycans, in the region. In addition to the jerrycans, in Puncak district PMI distributed food parcels to affected community in Agandugume, Lambewi and Sinak districts.</p> <p><i>(Sources: Document review, KIIs with DREF implementation team).</i></p>	
4. INTEGRATION OF CROSS-CUTTING THEMES		
Guiding Question: Were cross-cutting themes integrated in a meaningful way into all phases of the operation completed to date?		

Sub-criteria: Consideration of vulnerability	Overall Score: 3.25/5	
<p>Question 1: Did the operation consider in its design the differing vulnerabilities of people within the affected communities?</p>	<p>Score 3.5/5</p> <p>5: Vulnerability extremely well integrated into operation design.</p> <p>4: Vulnerability well integrated into operation design.</p> <p>3: Vulnerability integrated into operation design.</p> <p>2: Vulnerability partially integrated into operation design.</p> <p>1: Vulnerability not integrated into operation design.</p>	<p>Justification: Vulnerability-related information was collected and used to inform beneficiary selection. PMI adapted the standardized government data collection into PMI's beneficiary selection and assistance. PMI could have ensured that vulnerability-related efforts were better documented and clearly integrated into mass activities such as water trucking.</p>
QUESTION	KEY POINTS/OBSERVATIONS AND DATA SOURCES	
<p>MANDATORY 15: Was vulnerability-related information (sex, age, disability and others) collected and used to inform beneficiary selection criteria?</p>	<p>As part of this DREF, PMI collected vulnerability-related data when conducting needs assessments at the community level. As an auxiliary to the government, PMI also consulted the Ministry of Social Affairs for vulnerability-related data when identifying individuals who required livelihood assistance. Additionally, PMI included vulnerability-related information to inform its beneficiary selection criteria, specifically focusing on women who were pregnant or breastfeeding, female-led households, the elderly, or a person with disabilities household and had to have limited to no water supply. PMI volunteers specifically targeted vulnerable individuals by going door-to-door for the water distribution to households with persons with disabilities or elderly individuals. Overall, PMI did attempt to prioritize the collection of SADDD data during implementation, but data consistency and reporting remained a challenge.</p> <p><i>(Sources: Document review; KIIs with DREF DM team, PMI PGI Officer, PMI CEA Officer; FGD with PMI Lombok District staff, volunteers, and community members).</i></p>	
<p>MANDATORY 16: Was targeted people's selection of the NS validated with other agencies?</p>	<p>There were not many actors involved in the response to this emergency and PMI was the main player in the targeted communities which limited the risk of duplication. PMI conducted rapid assessments and actions based on the secondary information through its coordination channels with Meteorological, Climatological, and Geophysical Agency (BMKG) and National Agency for Disaster Management (BNPB). The immediate assessment results provided additional information on PMI decision making at the national level. Several members of the affected communities noted that PMI was the only organization providing humanitarian assistance through water trucking. As mentioned above, PMI did consult with governmental departments on the support it was providing in affected districts. For the livelihood cash assistance, PMI collaborated with the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Social Affairs on the selection of beneficiaries and their relevant vulnerability data (e.g., persons with disabilities or female-headed household).</p>	

	<i>(Sources: Document review; KIIs with PMI Disaster Management team, FGDs with Lombok province staff, FGD with governmental agencies).</i>	
Sub-Criteria: Integration of CEA activities	Overall Score: 3.75 /5	
Question 1: Did the NS actively solicit engagement with communities and accountability with all stakeholders?	<p>Score 3.75/5</p> <p>5: CEA was extremely well integrated into the operation.</p> <p>4: CEA was well integrated into the operation.</p> <p>3: CEA was somewhat integrated into the operation.</p> <p>2: CEA was not well integrated into the operation.</p> <p>1: CEA was not reflected in the operation at all</p>	<p>Justification: CEA was fairly integrated across all operational activities and particularly in the WASH and health activities but seemed to lack in the Livelihood CVA activities. PMI worked to proactively collect feedback and promote two-way communication with beneficiaries, through multiple channels of communication. PMI needed to promote beneficiaries' rights and also strengthen CEA in its Livelihood activities.</p>
QUESTION	KEY POINTS/OBSERVATIONS AND DATA SOURCES	
Did the NS conduct CEA training for responding personnel and integrate CEA mechanisms within its operation? If so, which ones?	<p>PMI did provide a CEA orientation session virtually, facilitated by the PMI HQ CEA focal point, to staff and volunteers for the DREF Operation. There were multiple CEA mechanisms implemented throughout the DREF operation, including a 24,7 hotline for affected community members to call if there were questions; a WhatsApp group for PMI staff and volunteers to answer questions or respond to feedback; door-to-door visits by PMI staff in areas that were receiving water trucking. Please refer to Question 3 for further information on the communication methods. It should be noted though that PMI staff indicated not all CEA feedback, requests, or questions were properly documents and reported on.</p> <p><i>(Sources: Document review, KIIs with PMI Disaster Management team, KII with PMI CEA Coordinator, FGDs with PMI Volunteers; direct observation)</i></p>	
MANDATORY 17: Did the NS actively promote targeted people' rights and provide access to information about selection criteria, targeted people' entitlements?	<p>In the assessment period, PMI did conduct FGDs with the community and incorporate feedback into the programming. There was a feedback mechanism, with multiple channels of communication such as a hotline or through door-to-door discussions with PMI volunteers, available for all targeted population during the implementation period. As the activities were for entire villages, the activities primarily did not involve a selection criterion, outside of the livelihood cash-assistance which the selection criteria were not shared with the targeted people. One area of improvement would be for PMI to inform the affected community on their rights and confidentiality for receiving assistance in future DREF operations and to include them in the vulnerability assessment.</p>	

	<i>(Sources: Document review; KIIs with PMI Disaster Management team; Lombok PMI staff and volunteers; FGDs with Lombok community members; direct observation).</i>	
Sub-Criteria: Integration of Protection, Gender and Inclusion (PGIE) considerations	Overall rating: 2/5	
Question 1: To what extent are PGIE considerations mainstreamed in the operation?	<p>Score: 2/5</p> <p>5: PGIE was extremely well integrated into the operation. 4: PGIE was well integrated into the operation. 3: PGIE was somewhat integrated into the operation. 2: PGIE was not well integrated into the operation. 1: PGIE was not reflected in the operation at all.</p>	<p>Justification</p> <p>PGI was not well integrated into all levels of the DREF Operation. While PGI was incorporated into the DREF Operation itself, the implementation of these activities and programming was missing. The NS displayed gaps in knowledge and understanding at the staff, volunteer, and community member level on PGI and Safeguarding policies, procedures and overall understanding of the topics. The NS did have some policies though, such as the Code of Conduct and the mandatory PGI training for all volunteers.</p>
QUESTION	KEY POINTS/OBSERVATIONS AND DATA SOURCES	
Has the NS conducted PGIE training, including PSEA training, for its staff and volunteers?	<p>Under this DREF Operation, PMI did conduct an online orientation for staff and volunteers across 17 provinces in September 2023. These sessions included topics such as PSS, PGI, and CEA facilitated by the PMI HQ staff. Upon discussions with PMI volunteers though, it was noted that not all volunteers had completed their mandatory trainings before beginning implementing, including not signing the code of conduct. This indicates that while one session was conducted at the beginning of the DREF there may be infrequent levels of completion for volunteers leading to a gap in knowledge and understanding on PGIE topics.</p> <p><i>(Sources: KIIs with PMI Disaster Management team; KII with PMI PGI focal point; FGDs with Lombok PMI volunteers and community members; document review).</i></p>	
MANDATORY 18: What Protection (SGBV), Code of Conduct/PSEA and child protection mechanisms were employed by the HNS to ensure protection of vulnerable populations?	<p>All PMI staff and volunteers were expected to complete an online webinar session, including PGI, CEA, and other topics before the beginning of the DREF operation. When discussing with volunteers though it was clear that not all volunteers had completed the training before activities began. While PMI personnel have a Code of Conduct which is obligatory for all staff, there is no Child Protection or PSEA policy as the former has been</p>	

	<p>in a draft policy review since 2015. The Code of Conduct must be continuously refreshed with the district-level volunteers. Finally, for PSEA reporting misconduct, this process is still in review. When speaking with community members during the FGD, there seemed to be a gap in awareness at the community level on how to report Safeguarding concerns (exploitation and abuse by humanitarian workers) and other protection issues (e.g., SGBV, child protection concerns, etc.). As the DREF Operation was originally intended to support 3,000 families with PGIE services this gap in understanding at all levels of the staff, volunteers, and community members is concerning.</p> <p><i>(Sources: KIIs with PMI Disaster Management team; KII with PMI PGI focal point; FGDs with Lombok PMI volunteers and community members; document review).</i></p>	
<p>OPTIONAL FOR INDO - MANDATORY 19: Does the operation have interventions target specific needs such as dignity kits, sexual and reproductive health services (health services), child-friendly spaces, etc.</p>	<p>No, this operation did not target specific needs such as dignity kits, sexual and reproductive health services, or child-friendly spaces.</p>	
<p>Are there any other PGIE activities implemented that has not been covered in other questions of this assessment?</p>	<p>PMI and IFRC CCD Jakarta conducted two PGIE assessments to ascertain the specific requirements of men, women, children, individuals with disabilities, and the elderly who were affected by the drought. Where possible PMI tried to tailor its programming to meet those needs such as conducting a vulnerability assessment with Indonesian government officials on who requires livelihood assistance.</p> <p><i>(Sources: KII with PMI PGI focal point; document review).</i></p>	
<p>Sub-Criteria: Environmental protection and preservation</p>	<p>Overall rating: 3.75/5</p>	
<p>Question 1: How effectively are environmental issues integrated into this operation?</p>	<p>Score 3.25/5</p> <p>5: Environmental considerations were extremely well integrated into the operation.</p> <p>4: Environmental considerations were well integrated into the operation.</p> <p>3: Environmental considerations were somewhat integrated into the operation.</p> <p>2: Environmental considerations were not well integrated into the operation.</p>	<p>Justification: The NS took into account environmental considerations for the operation where possible given that response efforts were for immediate needs and recovery efforts had to be minimal. The NS also is increasing branch-level capacities and reducing dependence on technical expertise from HQ which limited interprovincial travel.</p>

	1: Environmental considerations were not reflected in the operation at all.	
QUESTIONS	KEY POINTS/OBSERVATIONS AND DATA SOURCES	
Did the HNS integrate environmental considerations into its needs assessment and/or response activities?”	<p>Yes, PMI did integrate environmental considerations into the response activities through the inclusion of rehabilitating the communal water resources and water supporting facilities. This helped to minimize reoccurring water distributions and created a more sustainable way for affected community members to receive water more frequently. PMI has also recently started to digitalize its processes, which will result in a reduced environmental impact in the future.</p> <p><i>(Sources: KII with PMI Disaster Management team and Logistics team; direct observation).</i></p>	
MANDATORY 20: Are there any negative environmental impacts anticipated by this operation? If so, how are they being mitigated?	<p>Informants from the NS were cognizant of the environmental impact of their operation, particularly given that climate change was causing the drought originally. One negative environmental impact of the operation was the mass movement of mobilizing 49 water trucks across 44 districts; although this was only interprovincial movements it would be more environmentally advantageous to have a water truck prepositioned in each district that is drought prone, PMI did include early recovery efforts, such as the rehabilitation of communal water resources and water supporting facilities to strengthen water preservation and overall water use but these were of limited scope.</p> <p>PMI informants also noted that there is a concerted effort to reduce staff mobilizations from Jakarta to the affected provinces. PMI is focusing on decentralizing and localizing the response as much as possible to align with the Federation’s efforts and to reduce the financial and environmental impacts of staff mobilizations and create timelier responses. However, the NS remains quite centralized with most of the technical expertise sitting at HQ level still.</p> <p><i>(Sources: KII with PMI Disaster Management team and Logistics team; FGDs with Lombok PMI staff members; direct observation).</i></p>	



ANNEX 1 - METHODOLOGY

The monitoring team used a mixed methods approach that included the collection of quantitative and qualitative data through desk reviews, key informant interviews (KII), focus group discussions (FGDs), direct observations, and distribution of questionnaires, accompanied by meetings with relevant stakeholders.

Secondary Data Collection

The monitoring team conducted a desk review of secondary data that was comprised of the qualitative and quantitative analysis of key documents published as part of the DREF Operation, including:

- DREF Operation document
- DREF Operation Update document
- Operational Terms of Reference (ToR)
- WASH communication materials
- PMI PMER DREF Indicator Tracking document

Primary Data Collection

Interviews, Surveys and Focus Group Discussions

The monitoring team carried out primary data collection through 14 key informant interviews (KIIs) and focus group discussions with 10 participants; with 14 National Society staff (4F/10M) from relevant technical areas involved in the implementation of the DREF, one separate FGD with members of the IFRC CCD (3M and 1F) and with a BNPD members (4M), and Health Agency (2M).

Community Focus Group Discussions

During the field visits to the affected area (Lombok), the monitoring team participated in community focus group discussions. The group discussions participants were representative of the affected community groups targeted through the DREF operation and separated as feasible to ensure open discussions. The FGDs included open-ended questions focusing on the successes, challenges, lessons learnt, and efficiency of the support functions throughout the DREF operation. Similar group discussions were conducted with community leaders and branch volunteers.

The group discussions with the affected communities, community leaders, and branch volunteers mobilized for this operation were designed and facilitated by the CRC monitoring team and PMI staff. The community group discussions were facilitated over a day, including two focus groups with community members divided by gender: who were the recipients of WASH and Health support along with a following FGD with Lombok staff and volunteers.

Direct Observation

The field visits to the affected communities incorporated direct observations that complemented otherwise structured engagements and aided in furthering the review team's understanding of the group dynamics within the affected communities, among the branch volunteers, and within PMI's management. The CRC team's participation in field visits, with the NS staff, was an invaluable experience that strongly contributed to the overall understanding of the response context.

Limitations

Despite the overall well-structured monitoring visit itinerary, there were some limitations, as the monitoring team was bound by the NS team's community engagement plans and the geographical distances of Indonesia. Due to time constraints, the monitoring team was unable to visit all the provinces targeted by the operation. The choice to visit Lombok was made by the PMI team based on where the DREF Operation was previously extended to, which ensured that the monitoring mission did not place additional undue burdens on the operational team.

Reporting

This report was drafted by Madeleine Vloet CRC Manager International Emergency Response (NFIs) and Carlo Simonetti (CRC AP Regional Representative) and reviewed by Maria Alsalem (Manager, International Emergency Response – FAMP) Trilce Gervaz (Emergency Operation Officer) and Wartini Pramana (PMER Advisor).

ANNEX 2 – MONITORING MISSION TERMS OF REFERENCE

TERMS OF REFERENCE

Monitoring Mission: Emergency Disaster Assistance Fund (EDAF), Canadian Red Cross

NAME OF OPERATION	Indonesia – Drought Response 2023
APPEAL NUMBER	MDRID026
DATES	July 7-13, 2024
LOCATION(S)	Indonesia
PARTICIPANT(S)	Madeleine Vloet – Manager Emergency Operations (NFIs) – CRC Carlo Simonetti – Asia-Pacific Regional Representative – CRC

BACKGROUND:

Located along the equator, Indonesia naturally has two seasons that is dry season and rainy season. The dry season commonly lasts from June until November each year and the rainy season lasts from December until May. In March 2023, the Meteorology, Climatology, and Geophysics Agency (BMKG) issued advice that the intensifying El Niño phenomenon and positive Indian Ocean Dipole (IOD) may cause a drought during the dry season in Indonesia. The concurrence of both phenomena led to decreased rainfall across the Indonesian region due to the El Niño phenomenon. Based on BMKG's forecast, the dry season (determined from days without rain) reached its peak in October 2023 for several areas such as the Southern Part of Sumatra, the Southern part of Kalimantan, and Java Island, or November 2023 for Bali, East Nusa Tenggara, and West Nusa Tenggara area due to anomalies in Pacific Ocean temperatures that have been growing, with the index reaching 0.8, concerningly close to the threshold of 1, at which point the El Niño status goes from "Weak" to "Moderate." Adding to the forecast, BMKG indicates that the El Niño phenomenon will continue beyond February. Consequently, as El Niño triggers low rainfall probability, several areas or regions in Indonesia will continue to be impacted by prolonged drought or less rainfall in the area beyond November 2024.

On September 6, 2023, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) allocated CHF 580,079 from the Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF) to PMI (Indonesian Red Cross Society, Palang Merah Indonesia) for a drought response over a period of six months ([MDRID026](#)). This allocation aimed to meet immediate water needs of 25,000 people across 17 provinces through water trucking activities, provision of communal and household water storage. The prolonged drought season elevates the risk of water scarcity as a predominant concern. The absence of adequate water supply places households in a vulnerable position, subjecting them to potential threats to health, hygiene, and overall livelihoods. The operation also aims to develop community awareness especially in health, WASH, drought awareness and preparedness with integrated PGI and CEA components. The Operation targeted 25,000 people.

A DREF [Operation Update](#) was published on March 14, 2024. While the assessment concluded in January 2024, follow-up coordination took place in February 2024 between PMI HQ and PMI Provinces to update on the operation status. With IFRC support, an assessment team was deployed to analyse the changing situation and needs at the field level. With inputs gathered from PMI Provinces and Districts and considering the assessment results, PMI agreed to revise the plan of action to fit the evolving context. To fit the changes, the Operation Update included a revised operation budget reflecting changes in sector activities, operational, and supporting costs. Continuing the operation from August 2023 to February 2024, PMI actively responded to the needs in 131 districts across provinces in Indonesia.

Aligning with the assessment results and recommendations, activities continued in Bali, East Nusa Tenggara, West Nusa Tenggara, and East Java. Based on the assessment report, the team identified gaps and needs that were still relevant in the four provinces almost six months after the initial trigger date. With the additional timeframe, the operation duration was nine months, the maximum timeframe for orange-scale DREF operations. Aligning with the additional timeframe, several activities such as water trucking operations, WASH and health promotion, CEA, PGI, and DRR awareness were continued throughout the three-month additional implementation period until the end of June 2024. Livelihood needs were also considered a priority, where livelihood activities such as cash and voucher assistance for livelihood support and training were provided to the affected community.

CRC Contributions to the Response:

Funds from the Global Affairs Canada (GAC)-funded Emergency Disaster Assistance Fund (EDAF) in the amount of CAD 50,000 were contributed as a replenishment of the DREF on the occasion of the [DREF Operation](#) and [Update](#).

As part of its role to provide oversight of Canadian contributions to emergency response operations and CRC's efforts to ensure the quality of operations and level of accountability to all its stakeholders, a mission to Indonesia is proposed to monitor the implementation of the [DREF Operation](#) (as per the DREF Application and Budget) and the contributions of the EDAF project. CRC has an internal selection process³ of GAC-supported IFRC operations, and this DREF Operation ([MDRID026](#)), was selected for the monitoring mission. The selection was approved by IFRC, and CRC proposes that the mission be conducted in July 2024, in coordination with the plans and priorities of the Indonesian Red Cross Society, Palang Merah Indonesia.

OBJECTIVES:

³ CRC follows an internal process to select the operations to be reviewed. The criteria include:

- Geographical representation across the various global regions
- A NS that CRC has a long-standing partnership with CRC
- Trends in types of disasters (droughts are increasing and we need to learn from what is working and how we can better adapt our responses to 'slow onset')
- An operation that CRC mobilized one of its services for (i.e. funds, humanitarian experts, stocks, ERUs).
- The logistics of the mission (visas, field trips, etc.) and the security situation in the country.

- Engage with PMI to learn about the achievements and the progress made to-date against the planned objectives/outputs/activities in the agreed DREF Operation Application and Budget.
- Establish key achievements, challenges, and lessons learned within the DREF Operation, with the goal of identifying priority areas where CRC and GAC could consider further investments/advocacy, including at the DREF Advisory Group.
- Explore possible priority areas for PMI and CRC support on targeted preparedness activities.

OUTPUT(S):

- CRC EDAF Monitoring Report (including relevant annexes) using EDAF Monitoring template. The report is to integrate key cross-cutting themes (PGI, CEA, localisation, environment).
- A shortlist of priority investments that CRC could support on PMI's institutional preparedness (e.g. operational leadership, etc.).

SCOPE:

- The EDAF monitoring mission will be carried out at national headquarters level in Jakarta as well as in area(s) targeted by the DREF Operation activities (to be confirmed with PMI) for a period of approximately one week to 10 days.

ACTIVITIES PLANNED:

The EDAF monitoring mission will be carried out 7-13 July. Activity/schedule to be confirmed in line with the PMI recommendations but tentatively:

Evening Sun 7 July	
Mon-Tue 8-9 July	
Wed-Thu 10-11 July	
Fri 12 July	
Sat 13 July	

METHODOLOGY:

- CRC Regional Rep, CRC Emergencies Manager, and a selected PMI staff
- Desk review of secondary data available through IFRC Appeals and Go Platform.
- Direct observation (structured and unstructured).
- Focus Group Discussions (in-person as per the visit agenda):
 - Populations targeted through the DREF operation (and those not targeted if time available), ensuring the sample is representative of all groups (and separated as required to ensure open discussion, e.g., men/women, children, elderly, people living with disabilities, etc.)
 - PMI volunteers
- Key informant interviews (virtual and in-person, as per the visit agenda)
 - PMI staff from relevant technical areas, and respective areas targeted by the DREF operation at HQ and branch level
 - Members of the RCRC Movement including IFRC CCD Team, PNSs (as relevant)

- External partners including in-country INGOs, Government, and United Nations (as relevant)
- Data cleaning and analysis and development of final report as per EDAF M&E tools.

RESOURCES:

CRC will be responsible for the international costs, from the allocation that has been retained. PMI will be responsible for preparing the budget for the in-country costs utilizing the allocation that has been made.

Expense Line	Estimated Cost	Team responsible
Flights	<i>To be added by CRC</i>	CRC
Per diem for CRC Monitoring staff	<i>To be added by CRC</i>	CRC
Accommodation for CRC staff (Jakarta)	<i>To be added by CRC</i>	CRC
Accommodation for CRC staff (field mission if applicable)	<i>To be added by CRC</i>	CRC
Hotel expense for PMI staff during the field mission (if applicable)	<i>To be added by CRC</i>	CRC
Fuel for field mission	<i>To be added by CRC</i>	CRC
Access to vehicle for field mission		PMI
Access to PMI staff, including for field mission		PMI
Per diem for PMI staff during field mission (if applicable)	<i>To be added by CRC</i>	CRC

TEAM COMPOSITION:

Madeleine Vloet – Manager Emergency Operations (NFIs) – CRC (madeleine.vloet@redcross.ca)
 Carlo Simonetti – Asia Pacific Regional Representative – CRC (carlo.simonetti@redcross.ca)

KEY CONTACTS:

Maria Alsalem – Manager, International Emergency Response (maria.alsalem@redcross.ca)
 Celine McGarvey – Interim Director, International Emergency Response (celine.mcgarvey@redcross.ca)
 Carla Taylor – Head of Region Asia-Pacific (carla.taylor@redcross.ca)
 Wartini Pramana – Senior Advisor, Planning, Monitoring, Reporting and Evaluation (Wartini.pramana@redcross.ca)

ANNEX 3A – VOLUNTEER DISCUSSION GUIDE

NAME OF OPERATION	
APPEAL NUMBER	

BRANCH	
NO. OF VOLUNTEERS INTERVIEWED	
LOCATION	

DIRECTIONS	<p>Volunteer discussions are intended collect information, by providing a setting in that they can discuss their involvement in the activities planned, and what support they received from the National Society, which can then inform lessons learned and recommendations. Questions have been prepared to help guide the discussion.</p> <p>Introduce yourself, explaining who you are working for and that you would like to ask a few questions about the Red Cross activities that have been carried out, and their involvement. Ask them if they are happy to participate and explain that the answers are confidential.</p> <p>Please note that efforts should be made to ensure that attendees of the focus groups discussion are representative of the volunteers all involved in the DREF operation.</p>
TIMEFRAME	45 - 60 min

1. Please tell us how you are involved; and what your role and responsibilities are in the response (DREF operation)?
2. Please tell us what training you have received to assist with carrying out the activities planned in the operation?
2.1 What training have you received? 2.2 What training was useful? And why? 2.3 What training was not useful? And why? 2.4 What other training do you think needs to be provided to help you carry out the activities? Or what was missing in these trainings?

3. Please tell us what equipment/materials you have received to assist you with carrying out the activities?
3.1 What equipment/materials did you receive? 3.2 What has been useful? 3.3 What has not been useful? Why? 3.4 What else should be provided
4. Please tell us what other organizations are involved in the response to the floods and how you are interacting with them when carrying out the activities (how are you working together)?
5. Please tell us what is going well in the operation (successes), what is not going so well (challenges); and what is contributing to this?
6. Please tell us if you think there is anything that should be changed to improve the response (by the Red Cross), e.g. other activities etc.)
7. Please....what questions do you have for us?

Thank you for your time and sharing your views

ANNEX 3B – EDAF Monitoring Questionnaire

Canadian Red Cross – EDAF Monitoring Questionnaire	
EFFECTIVENESS	
Guiding Question: Did the operation meet, or is it on track to meet, the needs of targeted beneficiaries?	
Effective operational design and management	
QUESTION	KEY POINTS/OBSERVATIONS, INCLUDING DATA SOURCES
How many people have received assistance to date?	
Was there an adjustment in the numbers of beneficiaries targeted during the operation? Why?	
Based on the most recent DREF target, does the number above meet the target at the time of monitoring?	
If the operation has ended, what were the estimated actual achievement versus the most recent targets? What were the gaps, if any?	
Were there big changes to the needs/context to this date? Did the plan adapt to them accordingly?	
Communication tools and strategy – DM focal point	
QUESTION	KEY POINTS/OBSERVATIONS, INCLUDING DATA SOURCES
What methods were used to communicate with end-beneficiaries (e.g., radio, household visit, pamphlets)?	
Why was this methodology chosen and how well did it work?	
Timeliness of response - DM	
QUESTION	KEY POINTS/OBSERVATIONS AND DATA SOURCES
Did the operational funds arrive in a timely manner to the Host National Society? Why or why not?	
Were there any Early Actions taken by the HNS for this particular response?	
Were there any delays faced during the DREF approval process or any other IFRC emergency response processes?	
Were there any delays in the delivery of planned services to beneficiaries? Why?	
COHERENCE	

How well was response coordination within the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement partners managed?	
Movement Coordination	
QUESTION	KEY POINTS/OBSERVATIONS AND DATA SOURCES
How did the HNS work with responding partners to ensure a coordinated response?	
Were there any challenges related to overall regional and/or international support and IFRC response mechanisms (i.e., Surge, sit reps, bilateral assistance)?	
COST-EFFECTIVENESS	
Guiding Question: To what extent did the operation effectively utilize allocated funds?	
Budget adequacy	
QUESTION	KEY POINTS/OBSERVATIONS AND DATA SOURCES
Was the budget sufficient to complete the activities set out in the operation? If not, why not?	
Was there a sector or activity that required reallocation of funds? If so, why?	
Sufficiency of NS resources with operational needs - DM	
QUESTION	KEY POINTS/OBSERVATIONS AND DATA SOURCES
Were procedures for transferring funds to NS branches/field colleagues in place, and was funds transfer done in a timely manner?	
Did the NS use an Emergency Response Management tool (Emergency Operations Centre, Incident Command System, or others)?	
Was the operation adequately staffed?	
Were the HNS HR procedures in place adequate to facilitate expedited mobilization of resources for this operation?	
Did the NS have systems and procedures in place to monitor and report on the operation's progress?	
(If applicable) Did the HNS's logistics systems enable the timely delivery of supplies and equipment to beneficiaries?	
Were there any challenges related to the communication technologies (Internet, wireless network, mobile phones, radios and others)	
In what ways were learnings and recommendations from previous operations used in the planning/design and implementation of this operation?	
Value for money	

QUESTION	KEY POINTS/OBSERVATIONS AND DATA SOURCES
Were there any delays which resulted in additional costs being incurred to the operation?	
Were there inefficiencies in the operation which inhibited the ability to complete activities in a timely manner?	
Were there operational design choices which could have been made differently to increase the value for money?	
CROSS-CUTTING THEMES	
Guiding Question: Were cross-cutting themes integrated in a meaningful way into all phases of the operation completed to date?	
Consideration of vulnerability	
QUESTION	KEY POINTS/OBSERVATIONS AND DATA SOURCES
Did NS collect specific vulnerability-related information (sex, age, disability, and others) to inform planning?	
Was vulnerability-related information used to inform beneficiary selection criteria?	
Was beneficiary selection of the NS validated with other agencies?	
Integration of CEA activities	
QUESTION	KEY POINTS/OBSERVATIONS AND DATA SOURCES
Did the NS conduct CEA training for responding personnel and integrate CEA mechanisms within its operation? If so, which ones?	
Were beneficiary selection criteria communicated to the communities?	
Did the NS actively promote beneficiaries' rights and provide access to information about beneficiaries' entitlements?	
Integration of Protection, Gender and Inclusion (PGIE) considerations	
QUESTION	KEY POINTS/OBSERVATIONS AND DATA SOURCES
Has the NS conducted PGIE training, including PSEA training, for its staff and volunteers?	
Has the National Society proactively sought gender and diversity balance in (e.g., equal #s of M/F) staff and volunteers mobilized for this operation?	
What PSEA and child protection mechanisms were employed by the HNS to ensure protection of vulnerable populations?	

Has the HNS mapped referral pathways for SGBV, Child Protection cases and PSS to appropriately refer survivors? (it is not mandatory for DREF but it is for Appeal)	
Is the HNS in compliance with the Movement's requirements regarding the Codes of Conduct in emergency operations?	
Does the operation have interventions targeting specific needs such as dignity kits, sexual and reproductive health services (health services), child-friendly space, etc.	
Are there any other PGIE activities implemented that has not been covered in other questions of this assessment?	
Environmental protection and preservation	
QUESTIONS	KEY POINTS/OBSERVATIONS AND DATA SOURCES
Did the HNS integrate environmental considerations into its needs assessment and/or response activities?"	
Are there any negative environmental impacts anticipated by this operation? If so, how are they being mitigated?	



ANNEX 4 – LIST OF INTERVIEWS & FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS

Name	Position	Division/ Bureau
A.M. Fachir (M)	Secretary-General	PMI
Arifin Muh. Hadi (M)	Head of Office	PMI
Andreane Tampubolon (F)	Head of Public Relations Bureau	Public Relation Bureau PMI
Rafiq Anshori (M)	Head of the Center for Water, Sanitation and Environment	WASH PMI
Fajar Sumirat (M)	Head of WASH development	WASH PMI
Areis Indrawan (M)	Head of Emergency Response	DM Division PMI
Istianasari (F)	Head of International Relations	PGI Focal Point / PR Bureau PMI
Aulia Ariani (F)	Head of Publication and Documentation Section	CEA Focal Point / PR Bureau PMI
Mahfud (M)	Health Division Staff	Health Division PMI
Brahmantio Bagus W. (M)	DM Division Staff	CVA Focal Point PMI
Parmin (M)	Head of the General Bureau and Information Technology	General Bureau PMI
Ilham Huznul (M)	Head of Facilities & Infrastructure Bureau	Facilities & Infrastructure Bureau PMI
Masfuri (M)	Head of PMER	Organization, Planning, Evaluation, and Legal Bureau PMI
Nurbaiti (F)	Head of Finance Bureau	Finance Bureau PMI
Vijay Kumar (M)	Programme Coordinator	IFRC
Edwin Siahaan (M)	Disaster Risk Management Coordinator	IFRC
T Khairil Azmi (M)	Disaster Risk Management Coordinator	IFRC
Rachel Lee (F)	Asia-Pacific Regional DREF Manager	IFRC